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Scott Mobley. Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy,
American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity,
1873-1898. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Pp. 432.
In clear and smoothly-flowing prose, Scott Mobley offers many
compelling insights into the late nineteenth-century United States
Navy. Most emphatically, Mobley argues throughout the work that
the identity of the Navy transitioned from centring on an idea of
the “mariner-warrior” to that of the “warrior-engineer” between
1873 and 1898. This earlier identity celebrated the nautical ability
of its officers, as tested through sailing skills as well as knowledge
of gunnery and landing parties. As the result of the new warriorengineer mindset, however, strategic vision exemplified the acme of
naval professionalism by 1898. For these officers, this focus largely
entailed what we understand today as the operational level of war,
or a focus on campaigning. Less developed was a sense of grand
strategy. Although many naval historians have recognised the
emergence of this strategic mentality in the early twentieth century,
Mobley establishes its formation prior to the Spanish-American
War. Unfortunately, it is difficult to demonstrate how widely this
perspective suffused the Navy due to source limitations often
encountered by cultural historians.
Mobley, a former surface warfare officer who graduated with a
Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, also shows how this new and
increasing concern for strategy coexisted with an emphasis on what
he labels “mechanism,” or the technological components of the new
steam navy. Rather than accept the more typical division of officers
into camps of progressives and conservatives, Mobley splits officers
into two so-called “cultures of advocacy” for strategy and mechanism.
In other words, this was not a case of those with new ideas at odds
with those seeking to maintain the old. Instead, it consisted of two
novel perspectives that peaked in competition between 1885 and 1895
before amalgamating into a new “dichotomous” naval identity of the
warrior-engineer (p. 5).
Mobley consistently contextualises these developments within the
progressive movement, which he defines as “the use of specialists
and professionalized experts, scientific method [...] and an ethos of
efficiency” (p. 6). This leads him to challenge the work of earlier
historians, who have argued that naval officers’ careers isolated them
from larger society. On the contrary, naval officers helped pioneer
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major improvements in graduate education along with far betterrecognised institutions such as Johns Hopkins, sharing “common
intellectual wellsprings” in terms of pedagogy and research (p. 184).
Mobley also takes on a difficult task in challenging the school of
diplomatic historians as well as some naval historians who contend
that the U.S. built a navy in the late nineteenth century as an active
step in the pursuit of empire. First, the Navy had long existed to serve
empire, albeit an informal one, with its peacetime mission centred on
supporting national economic interests abroad. More controversially,
he contends that the Navy’s raison d’etre shifted during this period,
not toward empire but rather toward national defence in response to
perceptions of changing geopolitics. Some politicians, for example,
now assumed the Navy must be prepared to wage war in a matter of
weeks rather than months. This required the Navy to shift its focus
from an orientation on single ships to one of fleets, as reflected in
the increased strategic focus on campaigns. It subsequently took the
Navy a few years longer to get the kind of ships capable of fulfilling
this new vision of naval warfare. As Mobley argues, for example, the
ABCD ships did not herald a new imperial navy; rather, they fulfilled
the traditional focus on supporting national economic interests given
their limited technical updates from previous ships (p. 143).
This defensive focus also required more planning as epitomised
by the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in
1882. Strategy, some naval officers now argued, must no longer be
envisioned “on the fly” (p. 27). In this vein, Mobley suggests that
historians have overstressed the Naval War College’s role in shaping
this strategic vision while not giving enough credit to the ONI, which
began planning in peacetime for wartime contingencies in 1885. The
ONI’s establishment also exemplified the application of progressive
ideas because it provided a systematic and efficient method to
formalise the transmission of intelligence throughout the Navy.
This solid work has a few minor flaws. Mobley defines culture
as a “distinctive set of beliefs, values, ideas, and behavioral norms,”
but his focus on the naval identity of officers largely restricts itself to
a culture of professionalism (p. 185). As a result, his use of culture
challenges aspects of some standard naval narratives even if it
does not fully provide an alternative one. Elsewhere he eschews the
opportunity to dig deeper into naval culture, such as by interrogating
changing understandings of “heroic conduct” (p. 264). This might
help add nuance to the somewhat broad and undifferentiated labels
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of “mariner-warrior” and “warrior-engineer.” This reviewer also
wants to know who has more agency in this story: the naval officers
Mobley focuses most of his attention on or a handful of influential
and energetic civilians.
Mobley’s focus on this particular interwar period offers many
analogies to today, including a diminishing sense of physical space
affording a nation with protection by virtue of geography. It also
speaks to enduring debates about a more technocratic mindset as
opposed to one of breadth, as at this time “‘brain work’” increasingly
displaced “‘drill work’” (p. 249). Ultimately, this work challenges
traditional narratives even if it could go further in providing deeper
insights from the perspective of cultural history.
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